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Abstract 
In this paper, an IT artifact instantiation (i.e. software prototype) to support decision 
making in the field of financial market surveillance, is presented and evaluated. This 
artifact utilizes a qualitative multi-attribute model to identify situations in which prices 
of single stocks are affected by fraudsters who aggressively advertise the stock. A 
quantitative evaluation of the instantiated IT artifact, based on voluminous and 
heterogeneous data including data from social media, is provided. The empirical results 
indicate that the developed IT artifact instantiation can provide support for identifying 
such malicious situations. Given this evidence, it can be shown that the developed 
solution is able to utilize massive and heterogeneous data, including user-generated 
content from financial blogs and news platforms, to provide practical decision support 
in the field of market surveillance. 
 
Keywords: Big Data, User-Generated Content, Decision Support Systems 
 
1 Introduction 
Financial market manipulation has received much attention from regulatory authorities, 
resulting in trading suspensions of those companies that may have been hijacked by 
fraudsters. Recent suspensions included two large groups of penny stock companies 
suspended by the U.S. regulatory authority on a single day (SEC, 2012) before they 
could harm investors. All companies have been traded on over-the-counter (OTC) 
markets with low regulatory standards. For the assessment of potentially affected 
companies, the supervisory authority used information technology to recognize thinly 
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traded, low-capitalization stocks that could be affected by fraudsters. The system is 
calibrated to detect companies with low-priced penny stocks that are traded in low 
volumes or not at all; such companies must also be delinquent in their public disclosures 
(SEC, 2012). Unfortunately, the system reveals its weak point: namely, insufficient real-
time surveillance on voluminous and heterogeneous data. 
The pump-and-dump manipulation scheme is the most common form of information-
based market manipulation in financial markets (Dunham, 2007; Zaki, 2013). It first 
appears as the spreading of false positive information to market participants by 
fraudsters; this information, typically user-generated content (UGC) on financial blogs 
and news platforms, is enthusiastically spread by fraudsters attempting to pump up a 
stock price to an artificial level. Usually, the affected stocks are penny stocks that trade 
below $5. Before starting the manipulation, fraudsters buy a significant quantity of the 
stocks over a longer period of time. Motivated by spread positive information, 
uninformed market participants relying on the bogus story buy the stocks, effectively 
forcing abnormal price increases (pump) (Bouraoui, 2009; Huang & Cheng, 2013). 
Finally, fraudsters make a profit by selling their stocks at the increased price level, 
which accordingly causes the stock price to drop (dump). 
This paper addresses the question of whether the assessment of user-generated content 
has the potential to help regulatory authorities and financial institutions detect such 
situations. Therefore, the focus of this study is to present a quantitative evaluation of the 
final IT artifact that has been developed within a major EU project in order to 
demonstrate the feasibility of the approach. Accordingly, an evaluation based on a 
voluminous dataset is performed; for this purpose, OTC trading data and corresponding 
UGC related to 1700 companies were collected during 2012 and 2013. The collected 
data is used by the developed and instantiated IT artifact to identify situations of 
abusive behavior, and to assess whether those identified situations do actually demand 
more attention compared to those that were not identified by be suspicious. 
At this point, it is important to note, that the EU project involved several activities in 
order to provide services including technologies development as well as the 
development of data mining algorithms suitable to handle big data complexity and 
provide metadata for further usage for the different use cases. The corresponding 
development processes and associated findings resulted in more than 20 research 
articles and project deliverables (“Project FIRST,” 2013). Thus, in this present paper, 
the voluminous data utilized for this evaluation is provided by the mentioned services. 
In the next section, related background research is introduced. Next, I provide an 
overview of the developed IT artifact instantiation. Section 4 describes the quantitative 
evaluation based on real data, and the final section concludes this paper. 
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2 Background 
Relevant areas of study relating to this research in terms of stock fraud detection include 
literature on (1) stock touting impacts based on spam mails; (2) the impact of user-
generated news on stock activity; and (3) financial markets services architecture. Each 
area will be briefly discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Several studies examine of the impact of stock touting using spam emails. To generate 
profit, scammers spread misleading information. Authors (Frieder & Zittrain, 2008) 
investigate market activity prior to and following a stock touting email campaign, 
making use of a dataset containing about 75,000 spam emails. The research reveals high 
market activity beginning one day before email spamming commences and continuing 
until the day with the most considerable number of touting mails. The authors find that 
volume and return respond positively to touting, whereas the returns dip significantly 
following the conclusion of the campaign. Hence, the study suggests two main 
indicators for market manipulation: abnormal price changes and trading volumes, which 
will utilized by our IT artifact. Research conducted by (Bouraoui, 2009) demonstrates 
similar findings. The author provides an evolution model of volatility to assess the 
impact of stock spam emails based on a sample of 110 penny stock companies. The 
research shows abnormal returns three days after the commencement of spam emails. In 
both studies, the outcomes have been explained as the behavioral effect of market 
participants who have responded positively to the touting. Thus, these studies consider 
statistical approaches to explicate the influence of email stock promotion. Other studies 
introduce data mining techniques that help identify stock touting spam emails. Research 
by (Zaki, Theodoulidis, & Solis, 2011) observes spam massages to detect highly 
fraudulent stock activities by utilizing data mining techniques to identify stock touting 
spam emails. The accuracy detection of these experiments ranges from 58% to 71%. A 
considerable amount of research on the predictive power of UGC (such as tweets, 
financial forums, and blogs) on stock prices has been documented in the literature. In 
one instance, the research (Delort, Arunasalam, Leung, & Milosavljevic, 2011) 
introduce evidence of manipulation and examine the effect of such misuse in online 
financial forums. The authors show that manipulative user-generated content regarding 
companies with lower prices and market capitalization positively correlates to stock 
returns, volatility, and volume. One recent study (Smailović, Grčar, Lavrač, & 
Žnidaršič, 2013) presents a support vector, machine-based, sentiment classifier; here, a 
set of about 150,000 tweets thematizing eight companies (e.g., Apple, Google, and 
Microsoft) served as the data basis. The authors find that positive sentiment predicts 
positive movement in the closing price. A study proposed by (Zhang & Skiena, 2010) 
examines the ways in which blog and news data is reflected in trading volumes and 
returns. The authors demonstrate a significant positive correlation between media 
content and trading volume as well as stock returns.  Therefore, in this study the UGC 
data will be incorporated. 
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Several commercial stock market systems for monitoring and detecting abuse in 
structured and unstructured data exist; some, such as the Securities Observation, News 
Analysis and Regulation Systems (SONAR), are presented in scientific research 
(Goldberg, Kirkland, Lee, Shyr, & Thakker, 2003). SONAR, which aims to monitor the 
stock market, applies data mining, text mining, statistical regression, and rule-based 
detection to recognize both abuse patterns in structured data and unusual trading 
following publication of the news. A study by (Mangkorntong & Rabhi, 2008) 
compares two different surveillance systems as event-processing systems in such areas 
as memory usage, scalability, and flexibility. The authors reveal the strengths and 
weaknesses of the two systems and suggest a generic approach that uses numerous 
different event-processing systems to support the detection process (Mangkorntong & 
Rabhi, 2007). 
The next section introduces the Financial Market Surveillance Decision Support System 
(FMS-DSS), which was developed within an EU project between 2010 and 2013 
(“Project FIRST,” 2013). As an IT artifact instantiation it demonstrates how regulatory 
authority can be supported in detecting malicious pump-and-dump market 
manipulations utilizing voluminous and heterogeneous data streams. 
3 Instantiated IT Artifact  
During the research project, the opportunity to develop an instantiated IT artifact (FMS-
DSS) was provided. Within the research consortium consisting of research institutions, 
industry partners, and financial regulatory authority, software components have been 
developed in close researcher-practitioner collaboration. The problem owner (i.e., 
domain experts and regulatory authority) intervened according to the project needs and 
aligned the design principles with their surveillance issues  (Alić, Siering & Bohanec 
2013). 
Generally, decision support system configurations are built on the basis of three basic 
technology components related to: (1) data, (2) models, and (3) user interface (UI) 
(Turban, Sharda, & Delen, 2010). The following subsections will present these 
components. The data management component preprocesses and stores the needed data. 
The model component assesses whether or not given stock are suspicious of being 
currently affected by pump-and-dump manipulation schemes. The user interface 
component allows meaningful representation of suspicious situations. During operation, 
FMS-DSS continuously searches for the appearance of user-generated content related to 
monitored companies. For this purpose, unstructured input data is continuously 
retrieved, preprocessed, and stored in a database. 
Based on rules and models that were developed in close collaboration with the domain 
experts that were involved in the project, the UI shows alerts, indicating assessments of 
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how likely a stock is affected by manipulation (ranging from very high, high, medium, 
low, to very low). 
3.1 Data 
Selection of potential input data categories based on pump-and-dump manipulation 
scheme evidence: In meetings with experts (i.e., compliance officers and the regulatory 
body), the specific decision problem in revealing typical factors for pump-and-dump 
market manipulation was explained.  The three main types of information incorporated 
into the decision model are: the manipulation of information concerning the company, 
the manipulation of the financial instrument, and news as user-generated content about 
the company and its financial instrument. Consequentially, the three main input data 
categories of market abuse suspiciousness are Company, Financial Instrument, and 
News: 
 Company: According to the experts, there are two determiners for company 
suspiciousness. First, in those cases where the company is already involved in 
financial market manipulation, the financial authority issues litigation releases and 
puts the company on a blacklist, which is later refined into company, country, and 
industry blacklists. 
The second determiner of a company’s reliability is its history; the manipulator often 
targets newer companies and companies that have gone bankrupt and have recovered 
again. The History attribute is thus refined into the attributes Age and Bankruptcy. 
 Financial Instrument: This category is refined into the attributes Market and 
Trading. If a company’s financial instrument is listed in a market segment with low 
regulatory requirements, and the company itself has low market capitalization, then 
this instrument is seen as an additional indicator of suspiciousness. A change in 
trading volume or trading behavior is also seen as suspicious. 
 News: The user-generated content spread in social communities is closely analyzed 
by the model. The attribute News is refined into attributes Content and Sentiment; 
the former analyzes whether the web publication includes suspicious phrases (e.g., 
increase in revenue, new product development), and the latter captures the sentiment 
expressed within the news. 
This input data is provided by the developed services and described in (Grčar, 2012; 
Smailović, Žnidaršič, & Grčar, 2012). 
3.2 Model Description 
Based on further interviews, the attributes structure was transformed into a hierarchical 
tree (Alić et al., 2013), with the root node ‘Pump and Dump’ in the following P&D, 
based on a qualitative- multi-attribute-method as proposed in (Bohanec & Zupan, 2004), 
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differentiating between the pure user-generated-content data (News) and the 
heterogeneous data regarding the company and related financial instruments 
(Comp_FinInst). Hence, the tree consists of the two sub-trees: one for ‘Company’ and 
its related financial instrument ‘Comp_FinInst’ and the second one for ‘News’. The 
proposed model aggregates the attributes into assessment of pump-and-dump market 
manipulation: 
Pump and Dump
(P&D)
Comp_FinInst
Company 
BlackLists
CountryBlackList
IndustryBlackList
CompanyBlackList
History
Age
Bankrupt
FinancialInstrument
Market 
MarketSegment
MarketCapitalization
Trading 
TradingVolume
Nb. Of Trades 
News 
Sentiment 
Content 
 
Figure 1: The hierarchical tree of attributes (Alić et al., 2013) 
Attribute scales: For each attribute, the qualitative values are scaled in the range from 
highly suspicious (red colored) to not suspicious (green colored), where v-low is an 
abbreviation for very low, and v-high an abbreviation for very high (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The attribute scales (Alić et al., 2013) 
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The scales for each attribute value are defined by the regulatory authority members and 
can be reconfigured when in use by the end user. 
In our case, for example, the default setting for the attribute ‘Market Capitalization’ is 
‘low’ (highly suspicious) if the company’s value is under 5 million (given currency), 
‘medium’ if the value is between 5 and 30 million, and ‘high’ (not suspicious) if the 
value is greater than 30 million. In the next example the attribute ‘Market Segment’ has 
two values ‘no’ and ‘yes’. In this case the value ‘no’ means that the stock is not traded 
at the market segment with low regulations. Accordingly, the value ‘yes’ means, that 
the stock is traded at the market with low regulations (e.g. OTC market). 
Manipulation scheme indicators: Within the predefined timespan the proposed 
calculation intends to identify abnormal changes which can be seen as indicators (Eren 
& Ozsoylev, 2006; Goldstein & Guembel, 2008; Zaki, Diaz, & Theodoulidis, 2012) for 
pump-and-dump abuse. Hence, the suspiciousness is assessed as follows: 
 
Firstly, to assess recent changes in trading, long-and short-term average trading volumes 
are computed by taking the monthly and three-day averages of the trading volume: 
 
 
 
where TVi is the trading volume of the i-th day;  n = 3 days; m = 30 days. 
 
Secondly, to assess recent changes in number of trades, long-and short-term average 
trading volumes are computed by taking the monthly and three-day averages of the 
trading volume: 
 
 
 
where NTi is the number of trades of the i-th day; n = 3 days; m = 30 days. 
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Additional indicators for pump-and-dump market manipulation are calculated 
accordingly as presented in Table 1. 
Name Description / Definition 
Sentiment Long-
Term Period 
Sentiment of news based on assessment of long-term sentiment. 
Based on the overall picture of the mood of the news 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 = ( 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝐼=1 )/𝑚  
 
Sentiment 
Short-Term 
Period 
Sentiment of news based on short-term sentiment (daily). Based 
on the overall picture of the mood of the news of one to three days 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 = ( 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝐼=1 )/𝑛 
 
User-Generated 
Content Long-
Term Period 
Content of news based on assessment of specified terms. Based on 
the overall picture of the mood of the news 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 = ( 𝐶𝑖𝑚𝐼=1 )/𝑚 
 
User-Generated 
Content Short-
Term Period 
Content of news based on short-term specified terms (daily). 
Based on the overall picture of the mood of the news of one to 
three days 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 = ( 𝐶𝑖𝑚𝐼=1 )/𝑛 
 
Table 1: Calculation of average values of the input variables 
 
Thirdly, in order to calculate jumps in e.g. price (Frieder & Zittrain, 2008), the deviation 
of the short-term as related to the long-term average is calculated by dividing the short-
term average by the long-term average and multiplying by 100, as presented in Figure 3. 
Three cases are assessed: when the short-term value is smaller than, greater than, or 
equal to the long-term value. Suspiciousness is assessed using aggregated numerical 
input values, which are then mapped according to qualitative scales, as defined by the 
problem owner as high, med and low or as v-high, high, med, low, and v-low. 
 
Accordingly, structured data (such as e.g. trading volume) and unstructured data (such 
as e.g. user-generated content) are thereby taken into account in order to identify 
abnormal changes that may be indicators of pump-and-dump market manipulations. The 
recalibration of the indicator values or even the deployment of predefined default values 
can be adjusted by the end user. 
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Short term
Indicators:
Low= less than 50%
Med=between 50% and 150%
High= more than 150%
V-low = between 0% <and  <=3%
Low = between 3%< and <=5% 
Medium= between 5%< and  <=10%
High= between 10%< and  <=15%
V-high= between 15%< and  <=100%
Long term
(Short / 
Long) *100
 
Figure 3: Calculation of artificial jumps as decision rules calibration 
 
Output Calculation: The final pump-and-dump alert output value (P&D), is an 
aggregation of the lower level attributes Comp_FinInst and News, whereas the 
Comp_FinInst aggregates Financial Instrument and the issuing Company. News 
aggregates Content and Sentiment of the News regarding the Financial Instrument and 
the issuing company. P&D aggregates News and Comp_FinInst and presents the final 
indicator which indicates whether a suspicious market situation prevails. The scales 
consist of five values representing the decision rules as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: P&D alert output aggregation 
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For the v-high alert, three possible combinations exist; the alerts ‘high’ and ‘med’ are 
respectively defined by seven and eight possible combinations. The alert ‘low’ has six 
possible permutations, and the alert ‘v-low’ has one combination. 
3.3 User Interface 
Initialized by a routine at the end of the day (midnight), the Surveillance System begins 
the search for the appearance of user-generated content regarding the monitored 
company every day for a predefined time period (e.g., within the last 30 days). For this 
purpose, the unstructured data is continuously retrieved, preprocessed by the developed 
services, and stored in the database where it can be assessed by the FMS-DSS. The 
FMS-DSS subsequently collects other related input data.  
Based on end-user defined rules, the output appears as a signal which can be either a v-
high, high, medium, low, or v-low alert. The following figure depicts a detailed view of 
alerts as displayed on the end-user screen. This view allows the user to drill down to a 
more detailed level for each alert. The related P&D output values are then stored in the 
database, enabling the user to post-analyze the suspect alerts. 
 
Figure 5: FMS-DSS prototype  
The FMS-DSS user interface depicted in figure 5 consists of a screen showing the listed 
‘Alerts’ and ‘Details’ with specific information on each alert. 
The warnings listed in the ‘Alerts’ screen provide general information to the end user. 
Here, the company name in the list is replaced with an International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN), and the exchange where the security is traded. The screen 
also displays the alert number under which the specific alert is stored in the database. 
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The Date specifies the exact alert date. The user can select an alert from the list to view 
more detailed information. 
The ‘Details’ screen depicts the alert selected above. Here, the display divides the 
information into two parts; the upper part displays unstructured data, and the lower part 
displays corresponding structured data.  
In the unstructured data area, the graph indicates the appearance of positive (green) 
and/or negative (red) news. The yellow line represents the difference between positive 
and negative news. In the alert shown in this screen shot, the yellow line appears mostly 
in a positive sentiment area and the light blue bars represent the sentiment amount; in 
this example, we note the high appearance of sentiment on the 28th and 29th March 
2012. 
In the structured data, we can see three colored horizontal lines showing the highest 
(green), lowest (red), and average (black) of daily stock prices. The dark blue vertical 
bars represent trading volume. The alerts, appearing as yellow dots, are evident on the 
29th and 30th of March and the 3rd of April 2012. 
On the right side of the screen comprises some of the phrases collected from social-net 
news that have been used in the calculation of sentiment values; this feature allows the 
end user to observe the corresponding text and follow it to its source and author. Also of 
the right side of the screen, the Calculation tab contains further information on the 
calculation of the P&D output alert. 
For the user’s convenience, a history of alerts and the corresponding database ID of the 
specific company are also listed. The end user is thus provided with a range of 
information to use in the task of financial market monitoring. 
4 IT Artifact Evaluation 
This section presents an empirical evaluation of the presented FMS-DSS. In particular, 
the P&D output data is used for the performance assessment. 
This section is organized as follows: first, the data required for the evaluation will be 
described; then, after presenting descriptive statistics of this data, the relationship 
between the P&D output values and actual observed stock price changes is analyzed. 
There are two different sources of unstructured data considered in this dataset: user-
generated content gathered from a variety of financial blogs, and news platforms. The 
unstructured input data is preprocessed and stored in a database, which is then assessed 
by the other system components as described previously; the data published on 
regulatory authority pages is likewise stored as input data in the database. 
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Structured financial data is automatically downloaded by the system from a data vendor 
(which was involved as one industry partner in the research project), while regulatory 
data regarding the blacklist is stored as a list in a database and can be modified by the 
end user. 
Overall, three different data sources are considered: user-generated content, regulatory 
authority data, and stock price data for the period from 01.01.2012 to 03.09.2013. As a 
result, the P&D output sample generated by the FMS-DSS consists of 1700 OTC stock 
trades, with the corresponding structured and unstructured data containing 118096 
entries. 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The P&D output data is clustered within the five alert groups: very high, high, medium, 
low, and very low suspiciousness. The evaluations of suspiciousness in the given 
dataset of 118,096 entries are presented in Table 2. 
Alert Count Percentage 
v-high 982 0.83% 
High 22215 18.81% 
Med 92062 77.96% 
Low 2780 2.35% 
v-low 57 0.05% 
Table 2: Examination of the highest and lowest daily price changes 
Statistical analysis reveals prevalent medium- and high-value alerts. This may be 
explained by the sensitivity of the model. Certainly the model is developed as a 
qualitative model where pre-defined default values might be too receptive. Allowing the 
end user to configure their own aggregation rules and set their own thresholds would 
therefore allow for improvement in alert sensitivity, to the effect that false positive 
alerts can be reduced. The output data presented above already incorporates abnormal 
volume changes and other market abuse indicators as defined in previous sections. 
4.2 Manipulation Examination 
According to the domain experts involved in the research project, v-high and high alerts 
are the most relevant situations that demand further investigation. On that account, the 
evaluation proceeds by grouping v-high and high alerts into a suspicious class (v-h, h), 
and the other alerts into a non-suspiciousness class (m, l, v-l). 
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In the literature, significant price changes have been described as an indicator (Hanke & 
Hauser, 2008; Zaki et al., 2011) of stock manipulation. In the following, this measure is 
applied in order to determine if the developed IT artifact can provide support to detect 
potentially suspicious pump-and-dump abuse cases. 
In order to evaluate the system’s capability to detect such relevant cases, actual price 
changes in situations that were assessed by the system as highly suspicious (v-h, h) are 
compared with those that were assessed as less suspicious (m, l, v-l). In doing so, for 
each v-high, high, medium, low and v-low P&D output value, the changes between the 
highest (pH)  and the lowest (pL) daily stock price at the alert date are calculated. 
To assess the changed market price value for the lowest and highest daily prices, the 
following measure is calculated: 
 
A hypothesis is thus formulated to verify whether actually observed price changes 
related to the (v-h, h) class are significantly higher than the actual price changes related 
to the (m, l, v-l) class: 
 
 
In doing so, and given suitably sized samples (Nv-h, h =23197; Nm,l,v.l=94899) a t-test 
is applied to test the formulated hypothesis. The null hypothesis can be rejected at the 
1% level. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 N=118096 Mean Std. dev. Median 
(v-h, h) N=23197 1.24 3.65 0.41 
(m, l, v-l) N=94899 0.4 1.46 0 
p-value <0.01  
t-value 34.31  
Table 3: Evaluation results 
Undoubtedly, it appears that focusing on the group of v-high and high alerts is 
advantageous, as the t-value is highly significant. Hence, it can be stated that suspicious 
abuse cases where fraudsters first buy shares and then attempt to manipulate their price 
by spreading extremely euphoric content on social media, can be detected by the 
implemented FMS-DSS. 
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This statistical evaluation encourages in such a way that the default values as defined by 
the practitioners and regulatory authority might be seen as the best default values. A 
potential shortcoming from the end-user (e.g. compliance officer in a bank) perspective 
might be the huge number of potentially suspicious daily alerts (55 in averages) the 
system provides. 
In order to reduce the overwhelming number of positive alerts to capture only the most 
probable suspect patterns, further refinements might be undertaken by the end user, such 
as a threshold routine that calculates the changes between the highest and the lowest 
daily stock price. For every price change greater than or equal to a specified percentage, 
the routine will trigger an alert. 
An examination of such price changes results in a reduced list of 268 alerts, in other 
words, about one alert every two days. Thus, the procedure might reduce the noise of 
less relevant alerts and pinpoint the most suspicious manipulation cases. It appears that 
filtering based on price changes significantly increases the appearance of v-high values 
from 0.83% to 23.88% and of high values from 18.81% to 34.33%. The appearance of a 
medium alert, however, falls significantly from 77.96% to 41.04%. Hence, the final 
procedure will filter the most promising suspect alerts and help reduce their daily 
appearance to the lowest reasonable number. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This work has documented the effectiveness of the FMS-DSS and the importance of a 
market surveillance solution in improving the detection of information-based market 
manipulation. It has shown how the regulatory authority can be supported by the use of 
a market surveillance service. The evaluation results show that user-generated content 
can be utilized in near-real time using the developed FMS-DSS. The P&D alert results 
show that the FMS-DSS is able to handle voluminous and heterogeneous data and 
provide timely daily alerts by distinguishing suspect and non-suspect market situations. 
Most notably, this is the first study that investigates the effectiveness of market 
surveillance decision support that considers three different data sources: user-generated 
content, data provided by regulatory, and time series data from a data vendor. Our 
results provide convincing evidence for a long-term analysis (of approximately two 
years) of real data and suggest that the developed artifact may be effective in detecting 
real abusive cases of pump-and-dump market manipulation. However, some limitations 
are worth noting; even if the research is supported statistically, the artifact has not yet 
been evaluated in the real-world conditions of a compliance office. Future research 
should therefore include a subsequent effort in order to evaluate the acceptance and use 
of the running artifact. 
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